To show that something is “possible” or “impossible” does not seem, for Hegel, to be a genuine concern for philosophy. In point of fact, “everything is possible,” because everything has the simple form of identity-with-itself, i.e., does not contradict itself, - and it is equally true that “everything is impossible,” because, in any concrete content, the determinacy can be taken as determined opposition and so as contradiction. Hegel therefore concludes that there is “no emptier talk” than that of such “possibilities” (...) and “impossibilities”. (shrink)

This was the title of a symposium held in Moscow, May 27–30, 1986, and organized by the “International Association for the Study of Dialectical Philosophy—Societas Hegeliana,” in collaboration with the Institute for Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Participation was by invitation only. Thirteen participants came from the Federal Republic of Germany, twelve from the U.S.S.R., six from the Democratic Republic of Germany, four each from France and Italy, two from Bulgaria, as well as one each from (...) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada. Papers had been distributed previously and were briefly summarized to allow for more lengthy discussions. The two languages used were Russian and German. Simultaneous translation was provided. (shrink)

‘et quid agam?’ ‘rogat! en saperdas aduehe Ponto, castoreum, stuppas, hebenum, tus, lubrica Coa. 135 tolle recens primus piper et sitiente camelo. uerte aliquid; iura.’ In 1. 136, Clausen's’ adoption of et from the best manuscripts would warm the heart of A. E. Housman, who takes exception to the e, ex, and ec of other editors : ‘Spell it as you will, the preposition is not natural: the camel carried the pepper on his back, not in any of his numerous (...) stomachs; and it does not follow that we ought to say “tollere piper e camelo” because there exist such phrases as “desilire ex equo”.’ Instead, he takes both primus and sitiente camelo as adverbial adjuncts to the predicate which are parallel in force and therefore united by the conjunction et. (shrink)

‘et quid agam?’ ‘rogat! en saperdas aduehe Ponto, castoreum, stuppas, hebenum, tus, lubrica Coa. 135 tolle recens primus piper et sitiente camelo. uerte aliquid; iura.’In 1. 136, Clausen's’ adoption of et from the best manuscripts would warm the heart of A. E. Housman, who takes exception to the e, ex, and ec of other editors : ‘Spell it as you will, the preposition is not natural: the camel carried the pepper on his back, not in any of his numerous stomachs; (...) and it does not follow that we ought to say “tollere piper e camelo” because there exist such phrases as “desilire ex equo”.’ Instead, he takes both primus and sitiente camelo as adverbial adjuncts to the predicate which are parallel in force and therefore united by the conjunction et. (shrink)

Translations, especially of important texts, tend to be controversial. In a collaborative translation, the controversy will start during the process itself, and may persist until the end. In our case this is reflected in two translators’ introductions. Translators and reviewers agree or disagree on the basis of certain principles. There are, one could say, two “schools”: those in favor of more contextual choices of terminology, and those striving for strict consistency. The first will be more inclined to distinguish between “technical” (...) and “non-technical” uses of the same term, and consider this to be part of the translator’s role. The latter will try to avoid making these distinctions, and leave as much room as possible for the reader to decide. The first also tend to see the translation as standing on its own, readily intelligible to those who are without any knowledge of the original language. The latter intend to serve primarily readers who are interested in developing some, progressively better, knowledge of the text in its original language. They will attach more importance to an extensive glossary, which ideally should be applicable to the translated author’s entire corpus. (shrink)

Plasminogen activator inhibitor‐1 (PAI‐1) is a physiological inhibitor of urokinase (uPA), a serine protease known to promote cell migration and invasion. Intuitively, increased levels of PAI‐1 should be beneficial in downregulating uPA activity, particularly in cancer. By contrast, in vivo, increased levels of PAI‐1 are associated with a poor prognosis in breast cancer. This phenomenon is termed the “PAI‐1 paradox”. Many factors are responsible for the upregulation of PAI‐1 in the tumor microenvironment. We hypothesize that there is a breast cancer (...) predisposition to a more aggressive stage when PAI‐1 is upregulated as a consequence of Metabolic Syndrome (MetS). MetS exerts a detrimental effect on the breast tumor microenvironment that supports cancer invasion. People with MetS have an increased risk of coronary heart disease, stroke, peripheral vascular disease and hyperinsulinemia. Recently, MetS has also been identified as a risk factor for breast cancer. We hypothesize the existence of the “PAI‐1 cycle”. Sustained by MetS, adipocytokines alter PAI‐1 expression to promote angiogenesis, tumor‐cell migration and procoagulant microparticle formation from endothelial cells, which generates thrombin and further propagates PAI‐1 synthesis. All of these factors culminate in a chemotherapy‐resistant breast tumor microenvironment. The PAI‐1 cycle may partly explain the PAI‐1 paradox. In this hypothesis paper, we will discuss further how MetS upregulates PAI‐1 and how an increased level of PAI‐1 can be linked to a poor prognosis. BioEssays 29:1029–1038, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The lyric speaker begins by turning his or her will into words, but begins to be a Browningesque speaker when this conversion leads to a turning of the will against words. This inversion, or perversion, of the will against its own expression requires a reader to entertain a complex notion of the relationship between intention and language—or, more accurately, to hold in suspension two competing versions of that relationship. A reader learns not only to conceive interpretation in the simple lyric (...) sense, as a prevailing assertion of the will, but also to conceive any given assertion of the will, any intention given over to articulation in language, as an interpretation and therefore a potential falsification inviting further refinement. The playful competition Browning urges between these two conceptions of intentionality frees meaning to wander somewhere beyond the ken of each lyric speaker, somewhere in the future of lyric utterance. Meaning is to the dramatic lyric what action is to the drama proper; and much as the curious "action in character" of Browning's dramas defers dramatic action and makes room for play, so Browning defers meaning in the lyrics by enlisting the patterning forces of the self-interfering will.1· 1. Browning remarked in the preface to Strafford that his play turned on "Action in the Character rather than Character in Action".Herbert F. Tucker, Jr., an assistant professor of English at Northwestern University, has published articles on Hopkins and Browning. An expanded version of the present essay appears in his Browning's Beginnings: The Art of Disclosure. (shrink)

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MARXISM AND LIBERALISM edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Jeffrey Paul and John Ahrens New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 223 pp., $14?95 (paper) LIBERALISM by John Gray Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 106 pp., $9.95 (paper).

THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIALIST RIGHTS by Tom Campbell Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. 296 pp., $12.95 Campbell's attempt to construct a socialist version of rights and the rule of law fails because it does not draw on individualism. Campbell's positive rights are ineffective barrien to both the schemes of Utopian visionaries who command political authority and more mundane sources of the abuse of power. He leaves unanswered the question of who will determine the extent (...) of the ?needs?; that would constitute socialist rights, in the absence of unlimited resources to fulfill them. And his rejection of individualism ¡eaves him no means of adjudicating among conflicting positive claim?rights. (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs.' Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis.

Alienation and Connection addresses social constructs that perpetuate alienation through suffering. The contributors discuss how alienation through suffering in a variety of contexts can be transformed into connection and reconnection: human relationship with the environment, economic and social systems that disconnect and reconnect, cultural constructs that divide or can heal, encountered difference that brings opportunity, and various manifestations of personal pain that can be survived and even overcome.

A property, F, is maximal i?, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.